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Abstract
Assumptions are made by government and technology providers about the power relationships that shape the use of tech-
nological security controls and the norms under which technology usage occurs. We present a case study carried out in the
North East of England that examined how a community might work together using a digital information sharing platform
to respond to the pressures of welfare policy change.We describe an inductive consideration of this highly local case study
before reviewing it in the light of broader security theory. By taking this approach we problematise the tendency of the
state to focus on the security of technology at the expense of the security of the citizen. From insights gained from the case
study and the subsequent literature review, we conclude that there are three main absences not addressed by the current
designs of cybersecurity architectures. These are absences of: consensus as to whose security is being addressed, evidence
of equivalence between themechanisms that control behaviour, and two-way legibility.We argue that by addressing these
absences the foundations of trust and collaboration can be built which are necessary for effective cybersecurity. Our con-
sideration of the case study within the context of sovereignty indicates that the design of the cybersecurity architecture
and its concomitant service design has a significant bearing on the social contract between citizen and state. By taking this
novel perspective new directions emerge for the understanding of the effectiveness of cybersecurity technologies.
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1. Introduction
Assumptions are made by government and technology
providers about the power relationships that shape the
use of technological security controls, and about the
norms under which technology usage occurs. These as-
sumptions are coloured by notions of sovereignty and
the importance of not only protecting boundaries (in-
cluding national borders) in whatever space they mani-
fest themselves (digital or otherwise) but also in demon-
strating the exclusive control that legitimizes the exis-
tence and the authority of the state. In this article, we
present a case study that examined how a community
might work together using a digital information sharing
platform to respond to the pressures of welfare policy
change. Insights gained from this case study cast light
on the relationships between the security of the digital
infrastructure and the security of the people using that
infrastructure as they perceive it. Contrary to the typi-
cal start point for the security of such a platform, which
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might best be described as controls to protect the data
and the technologies, the community start point was
to build networks of trust and collaboration into which
the digital sharing technologies could be productively de-
ployed. Our conclusions are that whereas theories of se-
curity focus on the relationships between the political,
the social, the economic and the technological, the appli-
cation of cybersecurity controls is often focused on the
technical or physical protection of the digital infrastruc-
ture, therebymissing the social part of the sociotechnical
security system.
The case study leads us to question the sufficiency
of the security focus on the protection of the data and
the digital technologies, turning to security theory, stem-
ming from Hobbes and also the work of Mark Neocleous
(2008), for possible explanations of the apparent gap be-
tween the state’s use of cybersecurity technologies and
the security needs of citizens. Cybersecurity research fo-
cuses primarily on the “cyber” part of “cybersecurity”,
with the unfortunate consequence that the security con-
cerns of the citizen are literally invisible to it. We argue
that by locating cybersecurity issues within a broader se-
curity literature that takes into account the need to re-
spond to human insecurities, new directions emerge for
the understanding of the effectiveness of cybersecurity
technologies. When, on the other hand, we neglect the
citizen-centric view, the security implications of digital
service delivery are obscured.
From the case study insights and the subsequent liter-
ature review, we conclude that there are three main ab-
sences not addressed by the current designs of cyberse-
curity architectures. We argue that by addressing these
absences, the foundations of trust and collaboration can
be built which are necessary for effective cybersecurity:
• Lack of consensus as to whose security is being
addressed: in order for security to work to the
public benefit, it is apparent that citizens need to
feel secure as a result of its operation. If they do
not, then they take security into their own hands,
whichmight increase their local security at the cost
of undermining their ability to cooperate with out-
siders. Therefore, concentrating on the security
and well-being of its citizens is also for the bene-
fit of the state;
• Lack of evidence of equivalence between themech-
anisms that control behaviour: we argue that
when designing a digital service, a control is not
independent of the medium used to implement it
and a change inmedium changes some of the qual-
ities of the control, leading to changes in its effec-
tiveness. For example, when we replace socially-
based controls with technology we lose a whole
layer of communicative structures when certain
options are simply “greyed out” online;
• One-way legibility: the state has a need to make
the citizen readable by its standardised processes
(Scott, 1998) but no corresponding imperative to
make itself or its systems legible to the citizen.
However, it is apparent that this lack of legibil-
ity makes the citizen feel insecure―particularly
when the citizen feels that the state views it as
the threat.
We first present an inductive consideration of a highly
local case study. Whilst such a case study does not of
course allow us to generalise the findings, it does compel
us to problematise the focus on the security of the tech-
nology at the expense of the security of the citizen. We
will then consider the contribution that theorising about
social, economic and political security can make to the
design of cybersecurity technologies.
2. A Community Information Sharing Platform: A Case
Study
Our case study took place in the North East of Eng-
land, in a community suffering the effects of long-term
unemployment and degrading social, physical and po-
litical infrastructure. Researchers and an arts organisa-
tion, Proboscis,worked together to support a community
group in the design of an information sharing system that
would help their community respond to challenges asso-
ciated with welfare change.
The community group wanted to develop a system
of information sharing that used digital technologies to
enhance their capabilities to respond to welfare system
changes and provide community support for job seeking,
debt management, housing and tenancy advice and ben-
efit claiming. The research team wanted to observe how
such a community might design this type of information
sharing system as a means to better understand individ-
ual and community securities. The research centred on
two questions: (i) Which everyday issues become most
pressing due to changes in welfare rules and the move
to digital welfare delivery? (ii) How might communities
work together to alleviate those pressures?
When designing the case study, researchers wanted
to develop an empowering space in which participants
could reflect on and design for the types of support that
would help them and where the interactions between
the research team and participants were transparent. Ac-
cordingly, the research design was grounded in partici-
patory design principles (e.g. Coles-Kemp & Ashenden,
2012; Vines, Clarke, Wright, McCarthy, & Olivier, 2013)
that encouraged participants to co-design the research
questions, to influence the design of the data gather-
ing methods and to actively reflect on and contribute
to the presentation of the research findings. Following
the community participatory engagement principles set
out by Coles-Kemp and Ashenden (2012), the research
took place in a community centre which was a familiar
space for the participants, the research focuswas shaped
in partnership with the participants, the data gathering
methods were adapted to fit with the participant groups
and, to nurture a sense of empowerment and agency,
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participants were encouraged to consider community re-
sponses to the issues identified. Such an anthropologi-
cally informed design approach is particularly appropri-
ate for design projects that produce outputs that are
to be embedded and sustained within community prac-
tices. The case study acted as a provocation for us as
researchers by encouraging us to think about security
theory in relation to the use of technological cybersecu-
rity controls.
Five focus groups were carried out each with be-
tween 4 and 8 participants. In the initial group, the par-
ticipants were asked to articulate the range of economic,
emotional and administrative pressures that they expe-
rienced as part of everyday life. Such pressures shed
light on the conditions under which interaction with
state services might occur and the challenges such pres-
sures present for conformant use of digital state ser-
vices. In line with participatory design philosophy, the
research method used in this initial session was a sim-
ple storytelling method which encouraged participants
to describe the pressures experienced in different sce-
narios. The second focus group further deepened the re-
searchers’ understanding of these pressures using story
telling together with an icon-library to help participants
build up a visual and lexical vocabulary of pressures and
their responses. For the third focus group, story sheets
were developed thatwere used to systematically capture
the pressures, the needs for information sharing and pos-
sible community responses. This enabled a wider, more
systematic gathering of the issues and ideas for potential
community responses and support. The fourth and fifth
focus groups used a refined version of this story gather-
ing process until the principles for community support
had been developed. The focus groups were recorded,
transcripts produced and analysed using thematic analy-
sis before the results were then presented to the wider
community for consultation.
2.1. Results and Discussion
The strongest theme to emerge from the data analysis
was that of citizen insecurity and precarity. The data il-
lustrated the ways in which the interactions with the
welfare systems generated feelings of insecurity for the
individual. For example, participants felt that they were
not able to question or negotiatewith the systemand yet
experienced heavy penalties for making errors. As one
participant pointed out, “If you are underpaid, you don’t
get it back. If you are overpaid they expect you to pay
it back”. Participants highlighted that the problems they
experienced were due to the complexity of the system
and the constant rolling programmeof changes. The data
from the first focus group showed that participants expe-
rienced many such pressures on a day-to-day basis that
were exacerbated by the mechanisms used to interact
with the system. At the same time, finding ways to work
outside the system was also difficult. As another partic-
ipant commented, “The self-help route is fraught with
problems”. This insight led us to reflect on how inter-
action with systems connects to an individual’s feelings
of security and insecurity that operate at a deeper level
than is assumed by the presence (or absence) of techni-
cal security controls.
Analysis of the transcripts from the first and second
focus groups demonstrated how technology is conceptu-
alised as being interwoven with human social networks
and does not operate as a replacement for them. This
socio-technological enmeshing connects security tech-
nologies to the human networks in which they operate,
such that as one participant commented, “It was better
when you could see someone face to face. It was bet-
ter when you could phone for an appointment”. Not only
was technology not seen as a viable alternative for hu-
man interaction, these focus groups highlighted that hu-
man networks help to overcome the fear of engaging,
as one participant confessed that when reporting to a
change in status it, “took me nearly 18 months to phone
the Council”. This led us to think about in what ways the
design of a system that operates within human social
networksmight increase trust and confidence in working
with that system.
Analysis of the data from the first two focus groups
shows that receiving understandable information about
welfare changes from trusted sources was an important
means of reducing anxieties, thereby increasing the feel-
ing of security. For these participants, the information
you share and how you use it depends on your values
and morals as well as your individual circumstances. As
one participant said, “it’s a lot to do with your priorities”.
This is an element that digital service design fails tomake
allowances for―individuals have different priorities in
their lives and therefore have different positions onwhat
constitutes security. One participant in the third focus
group told the following story of how she had recently
lost her job: “The senior that was on, didn’t like us be-
cause she was me ex’s wife. She hated us and grassed us
up for everything. But I should have grassed her up first
because she was drinking on the job….But you cannot do
that”. This story highlights that values and morals shape
what information is shared, and how it is used. Yet digital
services assume an “idealised”, “abstract” or “model” in-
dividual interacting with systems and such abstractions
often lack ecological validity―a “cultural disconnect” in
which system designers illegitimately assume that sys-
tem users share similar characteristics to a dominant so-
cial type, able, for example, to manage passwords, ab-
sorb complex instructions and adapt easily to change
(King & Crewe, 2013). In such models attitudes and be-
haviours appear predictable and the state assumes that
it understands, and can make sense of, its citizens. This
insight led us to think about the importance of different
types of legibility and how the design of systems needs
to be able to adjust to different patterns of information
sharing and protection.
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2.2. Trust Rather Than Protection: A New Start Point for
Security Design
Whilst a Government cybersecurity response is more
likely to encompass access control and surveillance, this
case study indicates that a community approach is more
likely to focus on trust points, crowdsourced trust rec-
ommendations and the collaborative use of the commu-
nity’s own resources to dispel abusive behaviour. This un-
derstanding of how communitiesworkmightwell be pos-
sessed by those taskedwith local delivery of systems, but
is typically lacking in the higher echelons of policymakers
and system designers, a phenomenon which has been
called “operational disconnect” (King & Crewe, 2013).
The types of trust discussed during the study were
many and varied, including trust in the quality of the infor-
mation, trust in the individuals providing the information,
trust that the information exchangewill help their circum-
stances and trust that personal details would be kept pri-
vate. The participants showed that trust in the quality of
the information can be engendered through knowledge
champions who are seen as having specialist knowledge
and are validated through recommendations, through
their jobs in related areas, as well as through their track
record in providing specialist advice. Trust in the quality
of information was further engendered by peer review of
information shared within the community.
In the later focus groups, concern for the security
and safety of community members who were informa-
tion providers emerged as a dominant theme. These con-
cerns included liability if the information turned out to
be incorrect and concerns for the safety of the provider
if they gave information that involved local intelligence
about community activities. Of particular concern was
information shared about loan sharks and unhelpful or
abusive staff who provided state or state-endorsed sup-
port. A further concern was the potential for individuals
to use the information that was provided to them to de-
fraud the state or other institutions. The third, fourth and
fifth focus groups focused on ideas of information shar-
ing to better support each other in responding to the
pressures articulated. During this process, several key se-
curity concernswere identified: trust in the quality of the
information, the safety of the information providers and
the potential for manipulation or abuse of the informa-
tion provided.
These security concerns focus on the close proximal
relationships in everyday life. These concerns contrast
sharply with the more conventional cybersecurity sys-
tems’ protection approach that focuses on attackers mis-
using the system. It suggests an approach to protect cit-
izens who suffer as a result of the lack of information,
the flow of false information, the misrouting of informa-
tion by those who want to abuse the network and the
pressures inherent within the context of use. To address
these latter concerns, the start point is trust and col-
laboration rather than a control architecture to protect
against attackers and malicious activities.
Our case study insights led us to conclude that a com-
munity approach to security might focus on trust points,
crowdsourced trust recommendations and the use of the
community’s own resources to dispel abusive behaviour.
From our analysis of focus group data and a compari-
son of the community response with the typical state
approaches to technological control, we focused our at-
tention on the theoretical underpinnings of a security de-
sign that speaks to the three absences of security consen-
sus, control equivalence and two-way legibility that we
identified above. We conclude that such principles have
the potential to encourage a collective notion of cyber-
security and engender positive buy-in and active engage-
ment from citizens, facilitating a genuinely sociotechni-
cal cybersecurity system. We conclude that in the digital
by default era, trust between state and citizen is in large
part built by developing a cybersecurity model that can
(i) adjust to the security needs of the citizen, (ii) that pro-
vides a more comprehensive range of security qualities
and (iii) is legible to the citizen. We explore these three
principles below.
3. The First Absence: The Security of the Citizen
The insights from the case study reflect that security re-
quirements are often conflicting, culturally and morally
constructed and both individualistic and communal. To
explore how a cybersecurity model might better reflect
this, we need to look at the roots of modern conceptu-
alisations of sovereignty. The modern security commu-
nity theorises sovereignty of cyberspace along the lines
of the pioneering conceptualisation of Thomas Hobbes
(1588–1679), which still underpins both liberal and con-
servative theorising of the nature of the state. In par-
ticular, Hobbes suggested that sovereignty, to be effec-
tive and legitimate, needed to take a particular form,
and fulfil particular functions: it was contractual, and co-
constructed with (though not co-constituted by) the citi-
zens. People would rationally seek wider protection than
they could provide for themselves by surrendering their
rights of self-protection to a more powerful sovereign
which could protect a community from outsiders and the
members of the community from each other, therefore
promoting cooperation, trust and other forms of social
behaviour. It follows that, if people feel unprotected by
the state, then it is reasonable and rational for them to
seek protection elsewhere. “The end of obedience is pro-
tection” (Hobbes, 1996, p. 152), and therefore if obedi-
ence to the state does not give you protection, (i) pro-
tection needs to be found elsewhere, and (ii) the duty of
obedience evaporates.
We argue that as the state withdraws from in-person
contact to digitally-mediated interaction and as digital
technology facilitates the types of communication and
collaboration that can make possible the diversification
of wealth production and gives citizens the option to
move between modes of wealth production and social
orders, the security relationship between the citizen and
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the state needs to be re-negotiated. Such re-negotiation
is necessary in the first place because the assets that cit-
izens wish to be secured may not be the same as those
identified by the state (or large organisations). Secondly,
citizens may value particular types of behaviour or inter-
action which may be hindered or even prevented by se-
curity measures, and which may therefore prompt the
use of workarounds which undermine those measures
even in their own terms. Because of the co-constructed
nature of Hobbesian sovereignty, these are serious prob-
lems, because citizens’ acceptance of the legitimacy of
the sovereign (i.e. in the modern world, the state) de-
pends crucially on their own perceptions that it serves
their security needs. It follows that if the sovereign opts
to define the types of security it will provide on the
winner-takes-all model, it must either persuade citizens
that these are the types of security they value, or sac-
rifice legitimacy. If it fails to engage with the citizenry
upon matters of security, then it has to expect the cit-
izenry to have an antagonistic attitude, resulting in the
only option being to rule by force, treating its own citi-
zens as the enemy. The insights from the case study in-
dicate that an alternative means of overcoming this po-
tential for antagonistic outcome is to situate Digital by
Default (DBD) services within existing networks and em-
bed the services through a more robust security control
equivalence and through system legibility, thus both in-
creasing trust and creating spaces in which conflicts and
differences can be resolved.
4. The Second Absence: Equivalent Methods of Control
The case study data indicate many frustrations with the
control mechanisms deployed in the various state sys-
tems. For the citizenry to align with the state’s model of
security, the controls have to afford security to the citi-
zen. Yeung (2011) talks about the bond of trust between
the state and the community it governs pointing out that,
“small erosions may lead to its long-term degradation”
(p. 25). One of the reasons that trust may erode is that
the principles of control and the related principles of se-
curity remain the same but the mechanisms for opera-
tionalising them differ. Digital controls do not necessar-
ily carry the same signals of trustworthiness, legitimacy,
openness to negotiation, and ability to reconcile differ-
ent interpretations of security within a single transaction
as socially-grounded forms of the same control principle.
Lessig’s (1999) socioeconomic theory of behaviour
constraint argues that regulation (in the widest sense)
can happen through four mechanisms―the law, social
norms, economic incentives and architecture. Taking
this view, digital technology and sovereignty have been
game-changers for the state. Previously, the state had
monopoly control only over the law, and so that was its
main interface for citizen control. Now, it can alter the
architecture of its interactions with the citizen in order
to make certain behaviours more likely while ruling oth-
ers out (and it can also gather the data to evaluate and
refine its strategies in real time). It follows that it can
achieve its goals stealthily by adjusting the architecture
of interaction, rather than by commanding and punish-
ing; this is the basis of ‘nudge’ philosophy (Thaler & Sun-
stein, 2008).
This theory has much plausibility, but it has intention-
ally or otherwise led to the fallacious corollary, that, be-
cause control can be exercised through any one of these
four mechanisms, the mechanisms are interchangeable
for a given piece of control (Hildebrandt, 2015). In other
words, if some type of behaviour is prevented through,
say, a legal restriction, the control mechanism can be
changed to, say, a constraint on the digital architecture,
while leaving everything else untouched. Indeed, one of
themyths underpinning theDBD strategy for citizen-state
interaction is that the easiest way to do this is through
techno-regulation which Yeung defines as a reliance on
embedding regulation in technology design rather than
relying on the law to regulate. Yet this is fallacious for two
reasons that are relevant to our own inquiry.
First, the four mechanisms have very different prop-
erties. Techno-regulation uses the architecture of sys-
tems to enforce control. Yeung (2011) suggests that, “it
is the action-forcing character of techno-regulation that
makes it a particularly powerful form of control” (p. 4)
and goes on tomake the point that this way of regulating
human activity in cyberspace has negative “implications
for liberty, autonomy and responsibility”. Compare the
use of law to constrain behaviourwith the use of architec-
ture. Law has three properties that digital architecture
does not have. Firstly, one can disobey the law. There are
consequences if one does, but one can (and people often
do). This is an important source of freedom―consider
civil disobedience―which is not replicated by a techni-
cal architecture. Secondly, law can be challenged within
the law; one can take one’s case to higher courts. Archi-
tecture does not admit legitimate challenge (although it
can be illegitimately hacked). Thirdly, law needs a cer-
tain legitimacy to operate―it is at least in part created,
in a democracy, by a legislature that can be voted out by
the citizens it binds. Software (even open source), on the
other hand, is created by small expert cliques account-
able to no-one but themselves. Economic incentives can
also be subsumed by the architecture of a digital system.
In our case study, participants gave examples of how fail-
ure to engage with the system on its own terms resulted
in financial punishment by being underpaid or overpaid
and then expected to pay it back.
The case study indicates that citizens can choose not
to engage with these incentives and may well prefer in-
formal economic activities that are outside the control of
the state and bypass the digital system. Some of the so-
cial norms that sit around these informal economic activ-
ities emerge from our focus group community. Not only
does each of these constraint mechanisms have differ-
ent properties but the state is more likely to focus on
hard controls such as the law, architecture of the system
and economic incentives rather than attempt to tackle
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social norms and yet this mechanism emerged from the
case study as the most important factor in developing
trust and security through protection of the community
and its members. In other words, when we switch fo-
cus from the security of digital or financial assets to the
kinds of security that matter to the citizen, we see that
the hard constraints aremore likely to produce insecurity
than security, and consequently that the ideal of a co-
constructed sociotechnical security architecture in this
context fractures into a set of government controls de-
signed to counter community resistance.
The second reason is that the nature of the con-
straints in question is more complex than Lessig’s sim-
ple picture suggests. Perhapsmost importantly, pre-DBD,
the citizen might have spent time talking to a represen-
tative of the state who almost unconsciously performed
the vital communicative function of explaining the as-
sumed responsibilities of the citizen. This is a very rich
interaction of the citizenwith not only amonolithic state,
but its human representatives and also various other ac-
tors in the same society. The digital architecture wishes
most of this away, and replaces it with an input/output
function where the claimant identifies himself in terms
meaningless to him, but that the state recognises (e.g. a
biometric or a password), and then transfers resources
once it has verified entitlement. No conversation, expla-
nation or human interaction is needed from the archi-
tecture’s point of view. This is not merely a change in
interaction style but a removal of fundamental and nec-
essary qualities of security control. By contrast, the case
study reflects the importance of communication, interac-
tion and the negotiation of responsibilities that are pre-
conditions to the successful operation of a system.
5. The Third Absence: Legibility of the State to the
Citizen
The illegibility of the state systems appears as a clear
source of mistrust for our focus group participants. The
technologies of cybersecurity are built on a particular
type of mathematical abstraction away from the ev-
eryday, “embodied situated experience” (Cohen, 2007,
p. 213) of individuals, reducing visibility of the fluid-
ity that digital technologies both enable and encourage
(Bauman, 2013). However, reducing its visibility does not
remove it. Scott (1998) has described the processes by
which the state reduces complexity, by rendering its citi-
zens and their lifeworlds legible to administrative order.
This goes against typical living practices that are legible
for citizens, that are local, interested, contextual and his-
torically specific (Scott, 1998) and that make sense in the
particular circumstances of citizens’ lives. For the state
to intervene effectively, either to appropriate resources,
to control behaviour, or to manipulate behaviour, it has
to abstract away from all these factors to produce na-
tional, homogeneous, uniform standards. State simpli-
fication produces descriptions of communities that are
usually: (i) related only to the state’s interests (in tax-
ing, providing services, providing security, etc.), (ii) writ-
ten facts, numerical or verbal, (iii) static facts, snap-
shots rather than ongoing processes, (iv) aggregate facts
about groups and averages, rather than about individu-
als per se, and (v) standardised, based on categories that
bracket citizens together, no matter how unique their cir-
cumstances (Scott, 1998).
In the end, such an understanding engenders incen-
tives for people to abridge their own practice in order to
be legible by the state―for instance, an unemployed per-
son onwelfaremight be better offworking casually in the
informal economy, but the state recognises only the pos-
sibility of formal employment or enforced idleness. Its
rules are crafted on this assumption, giving the welfare
claimant the choice of forfeiting payments or foregoing
informalwork. If she forfeits herwelfare entitlement, the
social safety net is removed from under her, but if she
claims welfare and foregoes informal employment she
is unable to use her contacts and local knowledge (her
social capital) to help support her and her dependents,
and work that would benefit the local community is left
undone. The state, with its imperative to abstract and
simplify, ends up with individuals simplifying their own
behaviour deliberately to become legible to the state.
Note also that some commitment to transparency
(e.g. the provision of open data) may be necessary for
legibility, but cannot be sufficient. Government trans-
parency can only help when what is revealed to citizens
is legible to them. A data set in the Resource Description
Framework from data.gov.uk will not in itself accomplish
this. As our case study insights indicate, rich engagement,
and a willingness to discuss and explain, will be of far
greater value.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Sovereignty is the ability of a state to maintain the ex-
clusive power and authority to govern itself, for exam-
ple by maintaining control of, and managing, citizens
within, its borders. Neocleous (2008) argues that social
security is an important aspect of this imperative for
the state. An effective cybersecurity deployment is es-
sential if the state is to maintain its exclusive authority
and a secure DBD policy further bolsters this. Franzese
(2009) suggests that sovereignty in cyberspace depends
on a state receiving external recognition of its author-
ity and ability to, “exert some measure of control over
its own cyberspace” (p. 9), and such authority is under
heavy challenge at the time of writing. In the UK, the
importance of such recognition to the establishment of
sovereignty is encapsulated in the Government aspira-
tion tomake theUK the safest place to do business online
(UK Government, 2016). Achieving this aim establishes
sovereignty in two ways, firstly, through other countries
and global businesses engaging in online business with
the UK thereby demonstrating their confidence in the
control UK Government has over its cyberspace and sec-
ondly, through delivering secure Government services to
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its citizens, again demonstrating that the Government
has the ability to manage its citizens in cyberspace.
Sovereign capability in cyberspace is complex and
contested and the projection of sovereignty is demon-
strated, at least in part, through state activities around
cybersecurity. As Lessig (1999) points out, “real-space
sovereigns” (p. 198) will respond to the threat of cy-
berspace by attempting to ensure that their regulatory
power encompasses virtual spaces, and, by framing cy-
berspace as a spatial domain analogous to land, sea
and air (Murphy, 2010), will conceptualise the control
and management of cyberspace through cybersecurity.
This Westphalian model is traditionally framed as being
threatened by hacking causing the disruption of demo-
cratic processes by foreign powers, and by attempts to
copy or take control of data assets of UK businesses and
individuals. However, our case study gives us cause to
reflect that civil disobedience stemming from the un-
dermining of the social contract between citizen and
state is also a potential significant threat to domestic
sovereignty. In the era of DBD, civil disobedience can re-
sult in non-compliance with cybersecurity controls and
rejection of social policies and programmes as the citi-
zen feels forced to focus on their own security at the ex-
pense of making positive and creative contributions to
the state.
Neocleous (2008) makes a powerful argument for so-
cial security to be considered an integral part of a na-
tion’s security policy as its function is the maintenance
of social and economic order. If considered from this per-
spective, cybersecurity technologies of passwords, file
permissions, encryption and firewalls are digital means
of fulfilling this mission of order and containment. These
security technologies are core to DBD and embody a par-
ticular security philosophy. The case study participants,
however, focus on a different security mission, of mutual
support and information sharing. This mission addresses
the challenges of human insecurities rather than the frail-
ties of a system of order and rendering legible. These se-
curity missions are not mutually exclusive, but each re-
sponds to a different type of insecurity.
In the context of Neocleous’ argument about domes-
tic containment (2008), DBD makes cyberspace central
to the question of domestic sovereignty and this makes
cybersecurity and its control framework a central part of
domestic policy initiatives. The current security model
for DBD focuses on the protection of the data and the
technology with the assumption that this will also pro-
vide security for the citizen. By contrast, our case study
shows that the start point for an individual’s security is
not protection but trust.
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